WHO IS PRIVACY PROTECTING? DATA PROTECTION AS A DEFENCE TO ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN INDIA: PART ONE

The post, the Winning Entry of the 7th RFMLR Freshers' Article Writing Competition, 2026, is authored by Tabitha Koshy, first-year student of B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.
THE REFUSAL
When one could switch phone networks and keep the same number, it was much easier to leave one provider for another. But before that, most people didn’t bother switching because losing their number was too much hassle. Number portability changed that making it easier to switch and forcing networks to compete for customers.
Now imagine the same thing, but with an app. Let’s say, BigChat is a giant messaging app with 500 million users. Everyone's contacts, chat history and photos are stored there. NewChat is a comparatively smaller startup, but with a better and cheaper app. Here, people won't switch because they'd lose all their contacts and chats stored on BigChat and transferring them would be a major hassle; moreover, as a new app, none of their friends would be on NewChat.
NewChat then goes to BigChat and asks for data portability, thereby allowing BigChat’s users to take the data they have provided, such as contacts and chat history, from one service to another and permitting the apps to interact and talk to each other (interoperability). In the EU, data portability is a right under Article 20 of the GDPR. Interoperability is different as it means two services can exchange information and work together, so that a NewChat user could message a friend on BigChat. The EU’s Digital Markets Act defines it in Article 2(29) as the ability to exchange information and use it across services through interfaces. This piece deals with data portability only. NewChat knows that without either, the company cannot grow or survive long-term, since people will stick with BigChat even if NewChat is better. BigChat refuses, claiming that privacy laws wouldn’t allow them to share their users’ data. Sometimes that would be true, while other times it would be a convenient excuse. Keeping the data out of the rival’s access protects the firm's dominance in the market and, as a bonus, sounds morally right, making the refusal harder to challenge because privacy protection is widely accepted as a legitimate concern. Hence, the same refusal would look very different under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, and the consent and purpose rules of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (‘DPDP Act’).
REGIME ONE: THE DPDP ACT
Under the DPDP Act, a company holding personal data is known as a “data fiduciary”, and the person to whom the data belongs is a “data principal” (s 2(i) and (j)). The DPDP Act makes it very clear that any consent asked for must be tied to a legitimate purpose, and consent obtained must be free, specific and informed, covering only “the specified purpose”. The consent sought is limited to data that is “necessary” for that purpose (s 6(1)). The Act’s own example is a telemedicine app that cannot rely on consent to read a user’s contact list because the service does not need it and the principal’s consent cannot be extended beyond the specified purpose. Data Principals can access, correct and erase their data, but the Act gives them no express right to move their data to another service.
Looking at the example presented previously, theoretically, based on the DPDP Act, BigChat’s refusal looks safe and fair if it can point to its purpose, as a user who signed up for messaging has not automatically agreed to have the same data handed to a rival; there may also be substantial security concerns, and there is absence of any portability right.
REGIME TWO: SECTION 4 OF THE COMPETITION ACT
Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 concerns whether the firm is dominant and has abused that dominant position. Under Section 4, a firm is dominant if its strength in the relevant market lets it “operate independently of competitive forces” or affects competitors and consumers in its favour.
When the Competition Commission of India (‘CCI’) investigates a matter potentially contravening Section 4, it weighs multiple factors, such as market share, entry barriers and the “dependence of consumers on the enterprise” (Section 19(4)), to deduce whether an enterprise enjoys a dominant position or not. It is crucial to note that holding a dominant position in the market is not prohibited, but an abuse of such a position is.
Section 4(2)(c) bans practices “resulting in denial of market access in any manner”. In the aforementioned example, a dominant platform that refuses to let users take their data elsewhere can be said to shut rivals out. In 2022, the CCI stated that a dominant platform’s exclusive access to data would warrant an investigation.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIVACY AND COMPETITION
The example presented above shows that such a refusal gets two different verdicts, and these two laws clash specifically in four areas:
The DPDP Act mandates that consent be limited to a “specified purpose” (s 6(1)), so data that has been consented to be shared just for messaging would stay within that purpose. In contrast, Section 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act would be concerned with whether denying access to such data denies competitors market access, and also whether such a refusal could be categorised as an abuse of a dominant position (s 4(2)(c)).
The DPDP Act does not explicitly give the right to data portability, that is, the right to carry or transfer their data from a data fiduciary to another (ss 11–14). But if the CCI finds any abuse, it can order the firm to stop and can pass “such other order or issue such directions as it may deem fit” (s 27(a), (g)). Whether this wide power would reach an order to open up data is unsettled as of yet, and it has its limits as it would arise only after an inquiry finds a contravention of Section 3 or 4 (s 27), and this order can be appealed to the NCLAT (s 53B). In the WhatsApp case, the CCI ordered a five-year ban on sharing data for advertising and also required that access should not depend on agreeing to data sharing and that users should be given an opt-out option. The NCLAT had set aside the ban but kept the user-choice safeguards. This means such a remedy can allow the CCI to require a company to provide access to data, or even make it easier to transfer data to other firms, but a data-access order would probably have to work through user consent, and whether it could go further is a question for interpretation.
But firms reading these two laws may not be able to tell which Act would take primacy, since in a conflict between the DPDP Act and some other law, the DPDP Act prevails “to the extent of such conflict” (s 38(2)). Then, the Competition Act has the overriding effect of “notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith” in any other law (s 60). Yet each also states that it has been enacted in addition to, and not to contravene, any other law currently in place (DPDP Act s 38(1), Competition Act s 62). The Supreme Court has said that courts first try to read overlapping statutes together and then decide which prevails, only if that is not possible. Read together, the two Acts can usually exist simultaneously; for instance where a CCI orders data access that works through user consent, but an issue can arise if the CCI orders a transfer the DPDP Act does not permit, such as passing on data of users who never consented. In that case, the rule that the later of two special statutes with overriding clauses prevails would favour the DPDP Act, though that rule is not absolute. The conflict, however, may be much narrower than expected.
The Data Protection Board of India handles the privacy complaints, and the appeals against its decisions go to the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (‘TDSAT’) (ss 2(a), 27, 29). The CCI, by contrast, deals with cases of abuse of dominance, and appeals against its orders go to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (‘NCLAT’) (ss. 2(ba), 53B). Yet, the existence of two different bodies does not, by itself, mean that they are bound to disagree, but the main issue remains that there is no law to essentially fix how they would work together. The DPDP Act does not mention the CCI. The Competition Act lets a statutory authority refer competition issues to the CCI, and lets the CCI refer issues to a statutory authority, but only optionally (ss 21, 21A). Hence, the result would be uncertainty and duplication, whereby the two bodies could reach different, and possibly conflicting, conclusions about the same conduct, and a firm could face two proceedings and appeals over one act without knowing whose view will govern.
This conflict is already visible in the Meta–WhatsApp case. Before the NCLAT, Meta argued that India’s data protection law should govern the dispute. However, the CCI maintained before the Supreme Court that the case also raised competition concerns that were separate from privacy, since the question was not just whether WhatsApp could share users’ data, but also whether its data-sharing policy gave it an unfair advantage over its competitors. Finally, the Supreme Court’s direction to make the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology a party to the appeals further brought the government’s role in data protection into the dispute.
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