WHO IS PRIVACY PROTECTING? DATA PROTECTION AS A DEFENCE TO ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN INDIA: PART TWO

The post, the Winning Entry of the 7th RFMLR Freshers' Article Writing Competition, 2026, is authored by Tabitha Koshy, first-year student of B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab.
THE LIMITS OF THE PRIVACY DEFENCE
A. Did users consent?
Under Section 4(1) of the DPDP Act, personal data may be processed only with consent or for specified legitimate uses. If users did not consent, the platform would have to show that it had another valid basis for processing their personal data under Section 4(1) of the DPDP Act. Despite that, even if users agreed to the policy, that does not automatically solve the problem. Under Section 6(1), consent must be free and unconditional, and Section 6(10) places the burden of proving the validity of such consent on the company.
In Meta v. Bundeskartellamt (Case C-252/21), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that being a dominant company does not by itself make consent invalid, but it becomes relevant when judging whether users’ consent was freely given. The CCI found something similar in its reasoning for WhatsApp’s 2021 “take-it-or-leave-it” privacy policy update, wherein strong network effects and the lack of practical alternatives in the end left users with little to no real choice but to just accept the new terms.
B. Is the rival also a data fiduciary?
If the rival company is also classified as a data fiduciary, then it is apparent that it must follow the same legal obligations under the DPDP Act. This includes ensuring compliance with the Act under Section 8(1) and taking reasonable security measures to protect personal data under Section 8(5). The Act does, however, recognise that data may be transferred between data fiduciaries, and requires the sender to ensure that the data shared is complete, accurate and consistent under Section 8(3)(b). So, a company cannot justify the refusal to share data just because the receiving firm is another data fiduciary. Concerns with regard to the rival’s security measures can only hold if their safeguards are weak, and even then, the company could ask for proof that appropriate safeguards are in place, which is milder than refusing to share the data altogether.
C. Does the user start the transfer?
In this case, the privacy defence is the weakest when the user personally chooses to transfer their data to another platform. Section 6(7) of the DPDP Act allows users to give, manage and withdraw consent through a “consent manager”, who would operate through an “interoperable platform” under Section 2(g). This has to be distinguished from moving data between competing services, as a consent manager would be responsible for permissions, and the “interoperable platform” is just the system through which the users’ consent would be managed, and is not a data transfer link between BigChat and NewChat. Some view consent managers as a limited form of portability, although nothing in the Act requires BigChat to transfer data when a consent manager relays the user’s wishes.
If a user wants to move their data to a competing service, blocking that transfer may do little to protect their privacy. Instead, a platform blocking a transfer would protect itself rather than the user by preventing users from switching platforms and helping the existing company retain them.
THE TEST FOR PRIVACY JUSTIFICATION
The Competition Act, 2002 has already shown that a defence can be written into abuse of dominance. Section 4(2)(a), for instance, recognises justification for competitive need. While it is not a privacy clause, the Act allows some justifications, and a privacy justification may be interpreted similarly. Indian law otherwise does not clearly recognise a general justification defence. A company may claim that its refusal to share data is necessary to protect its users’ privacy. The CCI could set out regulations under Section 64 to explain when such a defence would be accepted and what the company would need to prove, since the firm should carry the burden, as it holds the facts, just as the DPDP Act already makes the data fiduciary prove consent (s 6(10)). A binding defence is safer if Parliament adds it, or if courts adopt it. Until then, the CCI can explain how it will apply the idea in its guidelines.
Such a test could be codified as:
A refusal by an enterprise considered as dominant to share data is justified by data protection compliance only if the enterprise proves that:
(a) the refusal is required by a specific provision of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, and
(b) the privacy harm is real and specific to the data and the data principal concerned; and
(c) no less restrictive measure would address it.
The test covers raw data the user supplied or generated, such as messages and contacts. It does not reach a firm’s own analysis or inferences, which even the GDPR portability right leaves out.
For this clause to operate, the CCI must prove dominance and abuse. Limb (a) needs to be checked against the DPDP Act’s wording and its subsequent interpretation. Limb (b) would require evidence produced by the firm in contention; an example can be a rival’s security record. If a transfer is possible technically but would still be risky, then the firm has successfully shown the risk under Limb (b). But it must still try safeguards under Limb (c) before refusing. The CCI may also seek the Board’s view under s 21A.
Using the example, “no less restrictive alternative” may include user consent or narrower data or security conditions. Instead of a flat no, BigChat could have asked each user for consent before moving their data and allowed those who agreed to proceed. It could also have limited the transfer to anonymised data, restricted sharing to contact lists rather than private chats, or required NewChat to meet basic security standards before sharing any personal data. If the firm can do any of these and still refuse, the privacy excuse looks weak.
If a situation arises wherein a party argues that a CCI decision would breach an Act run by a statutory authority, the CCI may refer the issue, and that authority must give its opinion within sixty days (s 21A). A statutory authority can refer a competition question to the CCI under section 21. So, whenever a dominant firm says the DPDP Act has forced its refusal, the CCI can forward this issue to the Data Protection Board, as this would fulfil limb (a) of the test, which asks whether a specific provision would even require the refusal. If a privacy complaint before the Board raises a competition question, the Board can use section 21 the same way. Both sections contain the wording “may”, so this could be entirely discretionary and optional. Whether the Board counts as a “statutory authority” under s 2(w) has also not been decided. The CCI should therefore adopt the practice in its guidelines, so that it becomes routine.
In Competition Commission of India v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., the Supreme Court held that a sectoral regulator should first decide jurisdictional issues, while the CCI can examine whether the conduct also violates competition law. The two regulators have different roles, so resolving a sector-specific issue does not by itself prevent the CCI from investigating any conduct suspected of being anti-competitive. But this judgment concerned the telecom regulator, TRAI, and the CCI, so it does not establish a blanket rule that every privacy or consent complaint must be decided first by a specialised regulator.
CONCLUSION
The EU’s Digital Markets Act (Art 6(9)) places data-sharing duties on designated gatekeepers upfront, without requiring proof of any violation. Conversely, India’s Competition Act works after the CCI proves dominance and abuse under section 4. The GDPR’s Art 20 portability right sits alongside this, and in Meta Platforms v Bundeskartellamt, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) emphasised the need for competition authorities to cooperate with data protection authorities when their respective cases overlap. Without an upfront duty as in the EU, India may employ the case-by-case test proposed here.
Data has become the main thing that dominant firms hold, emerging as a source of market power, and whoever controls it can lock out competitors. At the same time, India now has a data protection law, so firms have a legal framework to justify refusals. To implement this test, Parliament should write it into s 4 of the Competition Act, and for better coordination between the two authorities, the CCI should issue guidelines making a reference to the Board under section 21A a routine step whenever a firm relies on the DPDP Act. One of the biggest challenges would be to distinguish genuine privacy concerns from attempts to keep competitors out. Thus, privacy compliance cannot, by itself, justify a dominant firm's refusal to share data. It is a defence only where the privacy harm is real and cannot be avoided by a less restrictive means.
.png)
Comments